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Abstract
So far, only 40 countries have joined WTO’s Government Procurement
Agreement (GPA), from the developing world only some East Asian (Hong
Kong  [China],  South  Korea,  Singapore)  economies  and  ten  Eastern
European countries are parties to the agreement. This article sets out to
answer two interrelated questions: is it advisable for developing countries
to use public procurement efforts for development, and should more devel-
oping countries join the GPA? We survey key arguments for and against
joining the GPA, and by adopting the framework of public procurement for
innovation, we argue that government procurement should not be seen only
as an indirect support measure for development, but also as a direct vehi-
cle for promoting innovation and industries and, thus, growth and develop-
ment.  We  also  show  that  using  public  procurement  for  development
assumes high levels of policy capacity, which most developing countries
lack. In addition, we show how the GPA as well as other WTO agreements
make it complicated for the developing countries to benefit from public pro-
curement for innovation. As a result, the article suggests that the develop-
ing countries could apply a mix of direct and indirect (so-called soft) public-
procurement-for-innovation measures. In order to do this, developing coun-
tries need to develop the policy capacity to take advantage of the complex
and multi-layered industrial policy space still available under WTO rules.
Introduction
Public procurement of innovative products is seen by many as one of the
most  promising  innovation  and  industrial  policy  tools  of  our  time.  The
Internet, GPS technology, the semi-conductor industry and passenger jets
are perhaps the most prominent examples that resulted from government
2innovation-oriented procurement bringing along major economic and social
impacts. (Cabral et al., 2006; Ruttan, 2006) At the same time, public-pro-
curement efforts are also notorious for under-delivering. Consequently, the
obvious question in the development context is whether developing and
catching-up countries should include public procurement into their econom-
ic policy mix. However, to further complicate the question, many heterodox
economists argue that WTO rules which govern investment, trade, intellec-
tual property rights (IPR), services and also public procurement globally
have severely limited the economic policy space available for developing
countries to devise their own specific policy mixes. In contrast to most
other WTO agreements, currently only 40 countries have joined WTO’s
Government  Procurement  Agreement  (GPA),  from  the  developing  world
only East Asian (Hong Kong [China], South Korea, Singapore) economies
are  parties  to  the  agreement.  (Via  the  European  Union,  ten  Eastern
European countries are also covered by the agreement.) Thus, we have a
two-layered research question: is it advisable for developing countries to
use public-procurement efforts for development, and should more develop-
ing countries join the GPA? In fact, the GPA itself provides the context for
such research questions. Namely, Article V of the GPA states
Parties  shall,  in  the  implementation  and  administration  of  this
Agreement, through the provisions set out in this Article, duly take
into account the development, financial and trade needs of deve-
loping countries, in particular least-developed countries, in their
need  to:  (a)  safeguard  their  balance-of-payments  position  and
ensure a level of reserves adequate for the implementation of pro-
grammes  of  economic  development;  (b)  promote  the  establish-
ment or development of domestic industries including the deve-
lopment of small-scale and cottage industries in rural or backward 
areas; and economic development of other sectors of the econo-
my; (c) support industrial units so long as they are wholly or sub-
stantially dependent on government procurement … 
One can conclude that, similarly to other WTO agreements, the GPA sup-
ports explicitly – at least rhetorically – developing countries’ attempts at
catching up through industrial policy.
Using public procurement for developmental goals, in particular for innova-
tion (PPfI hereafter), is seen in the literature as a demand-side policy meas-
ure through which governments can generate new markets for companies
in order to develop new technological capabilities and solutions (Edler &
Georghiou, 2007). More concretely, PPfI is a special form of public pro-
curement that occurs when a public agency acts to purchase, or place an
order for, a product – service, good or system – that does not yet exist,
but which could probably be developed within a reasonable period of time,
based on additional or new innovative work by the organization(s) under-
3taking to produce, supply and sell the product being purchased (definition
based on Edquist & Hommen, 2000, p. 5). Unlike in regular procurement,
where governments place orders for ready-made or ‘off-the-shelf’ products,
procurement for innovation involves procuring products that need addition-
al (research and) development work and thereby influences the innovative
capacity of providers. (See also Rothwell, 1984, Geroski, 1990; Edquist et
al., 2000; Rolfstam, 2009; Uyarra & Flanagan, 2010). Such procurements
are used to solve existing as well as emerging economic and social chal-
lenges such as in health, energy, education, transport and environment.
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PPfI has recently made it to the agenda of international organizations. In
addition  to  the  European  Union  (ECEG,  2005;  European  Commission,
2010), the OECD also claims that PPfI has proven to be an effective meas-
ure in many countries and suggests for developed as well as developing
countries to introduce their own PPfI policies as part of the demand-side
innovation policy mix (OECD, 2009b). Moreover, OECD is of the opinion
that PPfI related programs, even in developed countries, must be acceler-
ated and expanded “wherever possible” (OECD, 2009a, p. 9). 
However, attempting to change micro-level “learned organizational capabili-
ties” (Chandler, 2005; also Nelson & Winter, 1982) for innovation and tech-
nological change via public policy is what classical industrial policy used to
be about up to the rise of Washington-Consensus policies and WTO agree-
ments in the 1990s.
2 We will show below that in the context of public pro-
curement, classical industrial policy represents a case of what today can be
called soft procurement practices. Indeed, in particular the East Asian post-
WWII industrial policy practices started with a rather clear idea of what kinds
of products were wanted and what kind of technological capabilities and
know-how was needed to achieve these products, and the government set
deadlines and quality standards to ensure continued improvement and pro-
ductivity increases in the production of these targeted products. At the same
time, most policy measures kept competitive pressures alive either via sun-
set clauses or other similar measures. Thus, the successive industrial policy
measures from one product to the next (from radios and light bulbs in the
1950s to computers and chips in the 1990s), East Asian industrial policy can
be seen as a prolonged process of public procurement activity. Today, how-
ever, many heterodox economists argue that the assent of WTO substan-
tially restricts the availability of such practices to development countries.
4
1 The development of environmental-friendly technologies makes PPfI in many ways similar to the
topic of ‘green’ procurement.
2 See Wade, 2003, Reinert, 2007, and Rodrik, 2007; and Cimoli, Dosi and Stiglitz, 2009 for most
recent discussions.5
We argue in this article that following renewed calls in the aftermath of the
global financial crisis to redeploy industrial policies for development (Cimoli,
Dosi & Stiglitz, 2009; Lin, 2009), these policies should involve public pro-
curement promoting innovation. At the same time, we show that due to the
complex nature of PPfI, the developing countries may lack the policy capac-
ity to implement direct PPfI policies and that they should mix PPfI with soft
(or in-direct) public-procurement-for-innovation measures (that is, industrial
policy) as the latter allows for policy learning to take place through experi-
mentation and is less open to rent-seeking and capture by interest groups.
(See also Rodrik, 2007) While the policy space has become much narrow-
er for industrial policy under WTO rules, we aim to show why it is impor-
tant to use the still available policy options; in our view, this enables policy
learning pivotal for more complex policies such as PPfI. In addition, we
show that within the development and WTO context, procurement is today
mostly understood from discriminatory perspective based on neoclassical
economics. We show the need to understand procurement from the per-
spective of evolutionary economics that has deeper understanding of tech-
nological change as precisely the latter is key for catching up. We conclude
by showing that developing countries are well advised not to join the GPA,
at least not in the immediate future. We aim to synthesize research from
various fields that are usually discussed separately. The resulting frame-
work to understand the role public procurement could play in development
under the WTO regime is the main value added of the article.
The article is structured as follows. First, a short overview is given of pub-
lic procurement and GPA in the context of developing countries. In the sec-
ond part, a case is made for PPfI as part of industrial policy. This is followed
in the third section by the discussion of how industrial policy represents a
case of soft procurement practices and how industrial policy fits into WTO
agreements. The fourth part is focused on the policy capacity problem. The
fifth part presents a public-procurement paradox that arises when develop-
ing countries would or would not apply direct PPfI on a large scale. The con-
cluding part summarizes the different perspectives of public procurement on
development. 
Public procurement and GPA
The WTO Government Procurement Agreement (GPA), which entered into
force in 1996, is the only WTO treaty focusing on public procurement and
is mandatory only to signatories (40 as of 2010).
3 According to the agree-
ment, the parties are required to apply the principles of openness, trans-
3  For  an  overview,  see  WTO’s  GPA  web-page  http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/gproc_e/
gproc_e.htm, but also Arrowsmith (2003) and Evenett (2002).parency  and  non-discrimination  (most  notably  the  principles  of  national
treatment and most-favored nation) to their national public procurement
laws, regulations and procedures. The treaty applies, from above certain
thresholds, for all public goods purchases and only those services that are
either positively or negatively annexed to the agreement. The governments
are allowed not to follow the GPA rules, for example, on the grounds of
high national interests or when procuring military products. In addition,
many members have conditioned their market access to that offered by
other  members.  The  GPA  also  regulates  the  arbitration  process,  both
nationally and on the WTO level. 
The GPA agreement is another initiative within the WTO framework that
aims  at  global  economic  development  via  liberalizing  global  trade.
Government procurement, which constitutes more than 10% of national
economy in most countries, has for a long time been used for supporting
national interests and is perceived by many as one of the main barriers to
free trade (Arrowsmith, 2003). In accordance to the comparative advan-
tage theory, it is argued that so-called discriminatory government procure-
ment makes states worse-off in the long run because it leads to inefficient
allocation of resources and limits the benefits stemming from free trade.
More  specifically,  the  benefits  from  liberalized  government  procurement
include access to other markets, support for liberalizing countries’ own mar-
kets, increased competition that leads to increased (international) competi-
tiveness, job creation and budgetary savings (Evenett, 2002; Arrowsmith,
2003, p. 769; Ssennoga, 2006). However, in spite of these claims, only a
limited number of developing countries have joined the GPA (Hong Kong
[China], South Korea, Singapore and ten Eastern European countries). Most
of the developing countries still oppose to the GPA ideas and since 1994,
no major developments can be reported regarding GPA.
There are many reasons proposed in the literature why developing countries
have resisted the idea of joining the GPA. For the sake of simplicity, one
can divide these into four: political, technical, secondary policy-related and
economic (developmental). From the political perspective, the rationale is to
be  found  in  protectionism  and  nationalism  (Evenett,  2002).  This  logic
assumes that the local money should be spent locally in order to increase
domestic output and assist local employment. This is a politically rewarding
argument that can be used regardless of its actual or long-term effects. The
argument of free trade is said to be counter-intuitive to many people who
deal with national industrial, competition and public-procurement policies
because  in  the  short  run,  market  liberalization  may  lead  to  job  losses
(Arrowsmith, 2003). In addition, the political and administrative elite may
find it beneficial to use discriminatory government procurement in pursuing
their personal or political gains. Further, joining the GPA poses several tech-
nical challenges for the developing countries. The developing countries may
6lack resources for implementing all the GPA requirements (setting up insti-
tutional environment, provision of reliable statistics, fulfilling transparency
requirements etc.) (Arrowsmith, 2003). It can be argued that joining the
GPA makes it harder to introduce and execute secondary policies through
public procurement such as social policy, supporting minority businesses or,
above all, industrial policy (discussed under economic arguments).
Most importantly, there are also economic counterarguments to joining the
GPA. Trionfetti (2000) has shown that discriminatory or home-biased pub-
lic procurement is able to influence domestic output, redress the structural
cost disadvantages and prevent unfavorable agglomeration. This is, how-
ever,  dependent  on  market  structure  and  sector  characteristics.  As
Trionfetti argues (2000, p. 73):
In particular, home biased procurement is likely to influence inter-
national  specialisation  in  sectors  characterised  by  increasing 
returns and monopolistic competition more than in those charac-
terised by constant returns and perfect competition.
As a consequence, if the developing countries with small home markets
joined the GPA, their governments would lose the ability to redress the neg-
ative effects of their small home markets in terms of higher production costs
and to counterbalance the globalization effects where the production of
increasing returns and monopolistic competition commodities concentrates
in places with larger demand (markets). At the same time, the current GPA
framework is based on an “all or nothing” approach, i.e. there is no gradual
adaption  possible  (Arrowsmith,  2003),  which  according  to  Trionfetti  is
inevitable if more developing countries were to join the GPA. If developing
governments were to join the GPA under current circumstances, they would
put their respective markets in unfair competition (see, e.g., Wade, 2003).
4
Also, joining the GPA does not solve the question of restrictions on the
movement of natural persons, which act as a serious hindrance to develop-
ing countries’ service exports in case of public procurement (Arrowsmith,
2003, p. 770). Yet, services have been suggested to be one of the most
important parts of the developing countries’ economies (Ssennoga, 2006).
In spite of the theoretical claims supporting the global free trade in govern-
ment procurement, the majority of the developing countries have consid-
ered the counterarguments strong enough to opt out from the GPA. The lit-
erature on the GPA – when dealing with the question of development –
7
4 This holds also in case of trade between bigger and smaller developed countries. As public pro-
curement has become an important asset in international free trade, the governments have become
very active in supporting national champions when penetrating export markets, while making sure
that the home markets remain protected. See Weiss and Thurbon (2006) as a case study of the USA
vs. Australia on the actual impact of the free-trade agreement on public procurement markets.8
seems to consider this to be problematic for global as well as domestic wel-
fare reasons. This debate stems from the argument of market failure, which
sees competitive markets as the main goal for national as well as global
economic policies since competition is understood to be the driving force
behind innovation and technological change. Evenett and Hoekman (2005,
p. 166) have claimed that
In the last 25 years, a small literature has developed focusing on 
the effects of international discrimination in procurement. Much of 
this  literature  considers  procurement  discrimination  in  perfectly
competitive markets and, in partial equilibrium settings, typically
finds no efficiency rationale for discrimination.
Under these premises, the implementation of secondary policies such as
industrial policy measures can be justified only in case of severe market fail-
ures. And even in case of severe market failures, these measures (e.g.
infant industry protection) are mostly considered to be ineffective due to
expected policy failures (Arrowsmith, 2003).
However, these arguments tend to ignore the recent development experi-
ence of the East Asian countries as well as the historic lessons from the
now developed countries in the North, where the traditional industrial poli-
cy measures (incl. high-level demand created through public procurement)
played a central role in the economic development and catching-up strate-
gies. Above all, these treatments fail to differentiate between discriminato-
ry procurement and public procurement aiming at promoting innovation. 
Public procurement for innovation
Innovation is increasingly seen as the main source of economic growth and
development. The conventional public-procurement literature assumes that
free markets and tight competition is the primary source for innovations and
that industrial policy through public procurement does not have a profound
economic rationale (Evenett, 2002; Arrowsmith, 2003; Evenett & Hoekman
2005; Ssennoga, 2006). Moreover, due to political reasons, the developing
countries  have  been  accused  of  overdoing  the  infant-industry  creation
aspect (Arrowsmith, 2003, p. 10 referring to Krugman & Obstfeld, 2000).
While some key neoclassical thinkers argue for an important role for indus-
trial policy in development (most notably, Rodrik, 2007; also Lin, 2009),
there is still one key aspect in which industrial policy is often misunderstood,
namely the role of technology in development. While in the context of devel-
opment and catching-up, we can detect a general overlap between evolu-
tionary and neoclassical thinking, there is a distinct discontent in under-
standing the role of technology. (See further Karo & Kattel, 2010a; also
Cimoli et al., 2006; Drechsler, 2004) More specifically, there are strong dis-9
agreements as what causes and stimulates innovations in the private sec-
tor. On the one hand, the evolutionary tradition argues that innovations and
economic  growth  in  general  take  place  because  of  knowledge  and  skill
agglomeration and continuous upgrading and technological change. On the
other hand, the neo-classical and also public-choice traditions argue that the
main driver behind innovations and growth are trade and competition: the
former using the comparative advantage of nations to bring more, better and
cheaper goods to consumers (higher efficiency); the latter creating pres-
sures for companies to incessantly innovate and outcompete the competi-
tors, and to push prices downwards in the process (higher efficiency, again).
This  difference  goes  back  to  understanding  the  nature  of  technological
development and its impact on companies and economies. The evolutionary
school  argues  that  technological  development  is  almost  always  path-
dependent;
5 neo-classical arguments assume that technology is essentially
freely  available  to  all,  competitors  and  countries  alike.
6 This  view  also
assumes that technological development is more or less linear, towards ever
more complex solutions yet with a rather clear path ahead. Thus, while neo-
classical economists set out to rectify market failures that prevent the dis-
semination of technologies and skills, in the eyes of evolutionary econo-
mists, entrepreneurs seek technological innovation in order to create market
failures. For evolutionary economists, technological development is anything
but linear and technology is anything but freely available. Path dependen-
cies, linkages, spillovers, externalities, winner-takes-all markets and highly
imperfect and dynamic competition make technology an unpredictable, high-
risk and possibly high-return endeavour that drives on a tautological logic:
technological development feeds on technological development.
7 (See, e.g.,
Arthur, 1994; Perez, 2002) These characteristics engender long-term struc-
tural changes in the economies in form of technology trajectories, paradigms
and geographical agglomerations. In particular since the early 1980s, evolu-
tionary economists have emphasized the latter, long-term characteristics of
economic development that are directly related to technology and innova-
tion. (See in particular, Freeman, 1974, 1987; Freeman, Clark & Soete,
1982; Freeman & Louçã, 2001, Dosi, 1982 & Perez, 1983, 2002)
5 As expressed by Dosi and Soete: “Technology … cannot be reduced to freely available informa-
tion or to a set of ‘blueprints’: on the contrary, each ‘technological paradigm’ with its forms of spe-
cific knowledge yields relatively ordered cumulative and irreversible patterns of technical change”.
(1988, 418)
6 See, e.g., Sachs who argues that “the very science and technology that underpin prosperity in the
rich world are potentially available to the rest of world as well” (2008, 205); similarly, the World Bank
asks “[w]hy is it that existing proven technologies are frequently not adopted by people who pre-
sumably would benefit most from these technologies”. (2008b, 3; see also World Bank, 2008a, 18)
7 As importantly, in evolutionary understanding, technology is a man-made comparative advantage
that creates havoc in the Ricardian comparative advantage model (Murmann and Landau, 1998).
What technological development shows is that the key is not trade as such but what kind of trade
and with whom. (See Gomory and Baumol, 2004, and Palley, 2006 for discussion)As shown above, the current debate on WTO and government procurement
has been mostly about the relationship between trade and procurement and
not so much about public procurement and economic development as such.
This perspective assumes that liberal trade rules and maximum competition
will eventually lead to sustainable economic growth both in developed and
developing countries. But as Singh (2002) has argued, it is not competition
per se that is important, but whether and to what extent it is capable of sup-
porting economic development. Thus, a maximum level of competition may
not be the best solution for developing countries and, instead, a more strate-
gic policy view could be used that mixes competition with co-operation.
Direct public procurement for innovation represents one possibility that can
be used to affect the technology life cycle, promote clusters and innovation
systems, and thereby increase urban, regional and national competitive-
ness. In addition, the role of the public sector could be seen as a facilitator
of innovation processes especially in the fluid phase of technology devel-
opment because both social and economic benefits for the region and/or
nation state might follow.
In more concrete terms, there are several ways that public agencies can
support innovations through procurement, namely:
• the creation of new markets for products and systems that go
beyond the state-of-the-art;
• the creation of demand “pull” by expressing its needs to the indus-
try in functional or performance terms;
• the provision of a testing ground for innovative products (Rothwell, 
1984, p. 166);
• the  provision  of  the  potential  of  using  public  procurement  to
encourage innovation by providing a “lead market” for new tech
nologies/solutions (ECWG, 2006).
Compared  to  the  supply-side  innovation  policy  measures  (see  Edler  &
Georghiou, 2007), the public sector can use PPfI to act as a demanding first
buyer  by  absorbing  risks  for  socially/ecologically  demanded  products
(where significant financial development risks prevail) as well as by pro-
moting learning (where procurement introduces strong elements of learning
and upgrading into public intervention processes). The government can be
the demander, bear higher entry costs, create critical mass, signal the mar-
ket and link innovation to production – and not just increase internal capac-
ities of producers (Edler, 2006, p. 8; Geroski, 1990). Geroski (1990, p.
189) highlights the direct links between innovation and production, show-
ing that – in contrast to supply-side measures such as R&D subsidies – pub-
lic procurement for innovations leads not only to technological capacities
but also to increased production capacities for innovations. In the context
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of  procurement,  it  is  important  to  note  that  governments  can  become
important end users via the procurement process. In addition to direct tech-
nological or product innovations, quality and other standards (e.g. ecologi-
cal) set by public agencies also play a key role. In this way, PPfI conceptu-
ally differs from discriminatory ‘off-the-shelf’ public procurement.
Although the current GPA debate largely ignores the positive role public pro-
curement can have on development and growth, history demonstrates that
countries like Japan, Korea, the US and others took great advantage from PPfI
when catching up with more advanced countries (Ruttan, 2006; Singh, 2002;
Okimoto, 1989). Moreover, this is a strategy that these and other advanced
economies still employ (ECEG, 2005; OECD, 2009a)
8 and that is also widely
used by many developing countries such as China (OECD, 2008).
9
Today, the advanced economies employ PPfI under the GPA framework.
This is perhaps one of the reasons why, for example, the EU countries have
used the tool rather modestly (see, e.g., ECWG, 2006).
10 The current litera-
ture on WTO and government procurement seems to univocally agree that
discriminatory procurement should be abandoned by the developing coun-
tries, and instead, as Ssennoga insisted “There is need to ask how other
developed nations became world players.” (2006, p. 239) But as history tells
us, they have done it mainly through industrial policies (incl. public procure-
ment), which are nowadays hard to implement due to the WTO framework.
Industrial policy as soft procurement
As argued above, at the core of traditional industrial policy, deployed by
mercantilistic states ranging from Europe during the 16
th to 18
th centuries to
East Asian countries in the post-WWII era, is the idea of targeting certain
industrial sectors for priority development. (For a comprehensive summary,
see Reinert, 2007 and 2009) Already early theoretical justifications for such
policies saw economies of scale, and resulting synergies, as the key reason
for differentiating between economies activities. (See, e.g., Serra, 1613;
King, 1721) Moreover, from the outset, industrial policies were relatively
complex: Colbert, for instance, used common measurement and quality
standards, organizing regional industry associations and other similar meas-
ures to push French textiles-industry development during his reign in the
second half of the 17
th century. (Cole, 1964; Soll, 2009) In particular the
8 Korea has a rather long history of large-scale PPfI projects, and since 1996, a special program for
SMEs is pursued (OECD, 2009a).
9 OECD claims that China is actually imitating the respective PPfI policies of the US and Korea
(OECD, 2008).
10 Before joining the EU, Sweden and to a lesser extent also Finland used to extensively implement
technology-intensive public procurement (OECD, 2005).cameralist variety of mercantilistic states in Europe often saw it as a key
role of the state to become an entrepreneur in new dynamic industries in
order to earn revenue (and not to tax industry). (Backhaus & Wagner, 2004)
These practices and ideas became a coherent theoretical framework in the
works of Friedrich List, who is seen to this day as the key author in infant
industry protection: in order to become competitive, a nation needs to go
through a phase of protecting its young industry via a tariff system. (See
from List, 1827 to Williamson, 2002) This idea of creating first domestic
markets for infant industries via tariffs, regulation, licensing and other meas-
ures dominated the post-WWII development consensus (Chibber, 2003)
and was perfected by the East Asian economies during that era.
One  can  summarize  a  stylized  industrial  policy  pursued  by  East  Asian
economies during that period as follows: first, policy measures were aimed
at a specific product not produced in the given country or done so on a very
weak level (from radios to semiconductors); second, government agencies
were often actively seeking technology transfer from abroad (usually licens-
ing technology); third, government also provided investment either through
direct subsidies, preferential interest rates or public sector lending, at the
same  time  directly  controlling  or  prohibiting  foreign  direct  investments;
fourth, most targeted products had a local contents requirement for their
production and fifth, this led to investment coordination of downstream
supplier activities; sixth, mostly such measures included either sunset claus-
es (government support lasted for a specific number of years) or domestic
competitive pressures (multiple companies were given similar support) or
both; seventh, switching from domestic to export markets occurred when
domestic producers reached certain previously set quality standards.
11
It is relatively easy to see that such an ideal-typical industrial policy has
many common elements with PPfI ideas and framework. Thus, traditional
industrial policy could be seen as soft procurement. This also explains why
PPfI is becoming so popular as it epitomizes a similar policy potential as tra-
ditional industrial policy did.
However, if development history teaches us that industrial policy is a con-
ditio sine qua non, then it is exactly the comparison of two very recent
instances of this strategy that can teach us the reasons for success and fail-
ure. Indeed, based on two recent historical experiences with industrial pol-
icy, East Asia and Latin America, we can create two ‘ideal types’ of clas-
sical industrial policy. In Table 1, we try to distill from the vast and diverse
historical data and different contexts two such ‘ideal types’.
12
11 This list is based on Wade, 2004, Amsden, 1989, Okimoto, 1989, Evans, 1995, Rodrik, 2007
and Reinert, 2007.Table 1: Ideal types industrial policy compared.
13
Source: Kattel, Kregel and Reinert, 2009.
East Asia
Temporary protection of new indus-
tries/products for the world market
Very steep learning curves compared to the
rest of the world
Based on a dynamic Schumpeterian view of 
the world – market-driven ‘creative destruction’
Domestic competition maintained
Core technology locally controlled
Massive investment in education/industrial 
policy created a huge demand for education.
Supply of educated people matched 
demand from industry.
Meritocracy – capital, jobs and privileges 
distributed according to qualifications
Equality of land distribution (Korea)
Even income distribution increased home 
market for advanced industrial goods
Profits created through dynamic
‘Schumpeterian’ rent-seeking
Intense cooperation between producers 
and local suppliers
Regulation of technology transfer oriented
towards maximizing knowledge transferred
Latin America
Permanent protection of mature indus-
tries/products for the home market 
(often very small)
Learning that lags behind the rest of the
world
Based on a more static view of the world
– planned economy
Little domestic competition
Core technology generally imported from
abroad/assembly of imported
parts/’superficial’ industrialization
Less emphasis on education/type of
industries created did not lead to huge
(East Asian) demand for education.
Investment in education therefore tends
to feed emigration
Nepotism in the distribution of capital,
jobs and privileges
Mixed record on land distribution
Uneven income distribution restricted
scale of home market and decreased
competitiveness of local industry
Profits created through static 
rent-seeking
Confrontation between producers and
local suppliers
Regulation of technology transfer 
oriented towards avoiding ‘traps’ Comparing the two, it is clear that key differences between these ‘ideal
types’ rest precisely in the issues that are crucial to PPfI as well; first, the
idea that development needs specific economic activities that exhibit long-
term potential  in  terms  of  learning  curves,  home-market  expansion  and
exports. Such activities provide dynamic increasing returns that in turn cre-
ate possibilities for continuous upgrading through educational, labor-market
and other policies. This is what East Asian countries did; Latin American
countries failed to target windows of opportunities in different activities,
and the need for competitive pressure was underestimated.
12 Second, the
failure to create dynamic economies of scale led to financial fragility rela-
tively easily, in particular when foreign capital inflows and lending became
prevalent  elements  in  the  development  strategy,  as  happened  in  Latin
America  in  the  1980s.  (Kregel,  2008b)  These  lessons,  however,  were
almost  completely  missed  by  the  Washington  Consensus  and  WTO
process. Indeed, it has become one of the most popular arguments among
heterodox economists to say that WTO has kicked away the ladder under
developing  countries  in  the  sense  that  most  industrial  policy  measures
described above and so successfully used in the past have become prob-
lematic under WTO treaties and in particular in BTAs. (See, e.g., Chang,
2002, Wade, 2003 and Reinert, 2007) 
The classical industrial policy assumed that economic activities are funda-
mentally different in their development potential: at a given point in time,
some activities were subject to increasing returns to scale and accompany-
ing  synergies,  while  other  activities  were  not.  Targeting  activities  with
increasing returns was the essence of industrial policy. (Reinert, 2007) WTO
agreements assume the opposite: all economic activities are alike. This is
expressed best perhaps in the very process of negotiations where developed
countries argued for access to developing country markets for their high-
tech and patent-based products and offering in return access for developing
countries’ textiles and similar products to the markets in the North. In other
words, WTO agreements assume more or less static technological capabili-
ties and trade from gains come from using these capabilities.
Accordingly,  the  establishment  of  WTO  in  1994  and  its  accompanying
treaties such as GATS, TRIPS, TRIMS and a host of other multilateral and
bilateral agreements regulating trade, IPRs and investment is seen by many
heterodox economists as severely limiting the policy space available for
developing countries.
13 As Wade succinctly argues, these international reg-
14
12 See similarly the comparison of South Korea and India in Chibber, 2003.
13 Wade, 2003, Gallagher, 2005, Shadlen, 2003 and 2005, Correa, 2000, Li and Correa, 2009,
and Thrasher and Gallagher, 2008 offer excellent summaries and discussions of such arguments. On
Financial Services Act and its impact also on current discussions about financial reregulation, see
Raghavan, 2009 and Kregel 2008a).ulations “are not about limiting companies’ options, as ‘regulation’ normal-
ly connotes; rather, they are about limiting the options of developing coun-
try governments to constrain the options of companies operating or hoping
to operate within their borders.” (2003, p. 622) 
However, there is a particularly strong agreement among researchers that
bilateral trade agreements (BTA) in many cases apply much more stringent
IPR regulations, trade liberalizations measures and investment requirements
than various WTO agreements proper. While some researchers argue that
WTO agreements are asymmetrical (“developing countries’ rights and devel-
oped country obligations are unenforceable”, so Wade, 2003, p. 624), oth-
ers go on to argue that developing countries should in fact cooperate in the
WTO to try to enforce the agreements also on the developed countries.
14
However, WTO agreements leave some and partially substantial space for
policy: for instance, the agreements leave more or less intact industrial pol-
icy ideas settled in the GATT agreement from 1947, which recognized
import  substitution  and  infant-industry  protection  based  on  increasing
returns
15 (see Article XVIII, paragraph 2). WTO’s Article XVIII allows coun-
tries  to  protect  themselves  from  competition  from  imports  in  order  to
restore balance of payments and Articles XIX and VI allow protection from
import competition also in individual industries (temporary safeguards) and
against unfair trade practices (anti-dumping). Further, as Amsden, 2005
argues, TRIMS allow for local content requirements to stay in place (this
has been used by Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Malaysia and
Thailand; Amsden, 2005, p. 220) Similarly, Reichmann, 2009 shows how
countries like China, India and also Brazil are using flexibilities under TRIPS
to their own developmental agenda. WTO law in fact allows for subsidies
in three key areas: 1) R&D, 2) regional development and 3) environmental
protection  (Amsden,  2005,  p.  221).  Clearly,  these  existing  flexibilities
should be emphasized in developing country capacity building exercises (by
WTO and other international organizations and NGOs).
15
14 See Shadlen, 2003; also Dreyfuss, 2009; further also Cimoli, Coriat & Primi, 2009, pp. 514-518
on flexibilities within TRIPS; an even wider discussion is provided by Rodrik, 2007, pp. 123-147,
and by Thrasher & Gallagher, 2008; the latter also discuss South-South agreements
15 See, e.g., GATT 1947, Article XXXVI, paragraph 5: “The rapid expansion of the economies of
the less-developed contracting parties will be facilitated by a diversification of the structure of their
economies and the avoidance of an excessive dependence on the export of primary products. There
is, therefore, need for increased access in the largest possible measure to markets under favourable
conditions for processed and manufactured products currently or potentially of particular export inter-
est to less-developed contracting parties.”Thus, while the policy space under WTO has become strictly defined and,
in contrast to earlier periods, most countries are party to various WTO
agreements,  the  policy  space  has  not  been  eliminated  completely.
However, what has become the focal problem under WTO is the policy
capacity to develop and implement policies that are conducive to innovation
and growth and fit into the WTO rulebook.
The capacity problem
The government procurement is notorious for constantly under-delivering
the expected results. There are various reasons that explain the poor out-
come such as lack of competitive pressure, lack of proper institutional set-
tings in terms of over- or under-regulation and organizational set-ups etc. In
addition, a country may suffer from low policy and administrative capaci-
ties. Regarding PPfI, the latter argument seems to be of special importance
because of the more complex nature of procurement for innovation and
because of the need to coordinate different vertical and horizontal policy
domains.
Indeed, on the administrative level, there tend to be too many goals to fol-
low in modern public procurement for the public administrators – cost sav-
ings, value-for-money, transparency, sectoral policies (e.g. environmental,
energy,  industrial  etc.)  –  which  often  contradict  each  other  (Cave  &
Frinking, 2007; Nyiri et al., 2007). This may lead to a misallocation of
resources,  where  agency  goals  conflict  with  wider  policy  goals  (New
Zealand Ministry of Economic Development, 2005). There is a dilemma
between the micro-cost effectiveness of a contract and the higher costs of
R&D-based  product/services  in  order  to  boost  innovation  (Cabral  et  al.,
2006). The process itself – procurement for innovation – is a costly and
time-consuming effort. Procurement for innovation demands strong coordi-
nation  between  stakeholders  and  constant  evaluation  and  learning.  But
coordination and evaluation always involves transaction costs, which have
to be taken into account when implementing the process. Cave and Frinking
(2007) have pointed to the fact that there exists the potential for expensive
coordination failure. When the payoff is unclear, the innovative solution can
be perceived as the more expensive solution (Brammer & Walker, 2007).
Therefore, at the end of the day, under the current culture of public pro-
curement, cost savings may still be perceived as the most important goal. 
Classical industrial policy, in turn, relied on what Reinert calls emulation:
successful cases of development during the 500 years of capitalism have
mostly been based on unrestrained copying from other successful coun-
tries, past and present. (Reinert, 2009) In essence, successful development
has been historically based on policy creation using history as a tool-box.
16While the latter includes basic principles such as infant-industry protection,
policy  bias  towards  increasing  returns  activities  and  other  activities
described above, the application of these principles has been based on con-
text-specific amendments – that is emulation, not simply copying. (See also
Karo  &  Kattel,  2010b)  It  can  be  argued  that  international  development
debate sought to agree more or less on the rules for emulation up to the
1980s and that the Uruguay round initiated the exact opposite. WTO and
its descendants (BTAs) assume universal rules and institutions that should
be more or less precisely copied by the developing countries in order to
widen  markets  and  allow  access  for  technological  and  market  leaders
whose activity should then lead to various spillovers and positive external-
ities. Thus, while emulation assumed high levels of capacity to choose from
a heterogeneous set of policy options, the WTO policy space assumes
decontextualization of policy-making (e.g. in what field and for how long to
grant patents and to whom versus patents should be granted in all fields
anywhere in the world for 20 years). The former assumes an institutional
framework for policy-learning, the latter in turn assumes the capacity to
implement agreed policies. Policy-learning is usually associated with high
levels of policy competence, strong bureaucratic autonomy and coordina-
tion, high levels of embeddedness between economic actors and the state,
exemplified by the Weberian state described by Evans and others. (Evans,
1995; Evans & Rauch, 1999; also Rodrik, 2007) Policy implementation and
copying in the 1990s, in turn, became associated with decentralization and
market-like discipline within the public sector, exemplified by New Public
Management reforms. (See Drechsler, 2005) These are, however, similar
values  emphasized  typically  in  the  current  procurement  literature:  cost
effectiveness,  transparency  and  enhanced  competition.  Both  WTO  and
mainstream  procurement  literature  assume  that  government  failures  are
usually worse than market failures and thus disciplining governments should
bring more return in the terms of developmental intervention. 
Consequently, WTO is based not only on a very different set of economic
ideas and ideals, but also on substantially different view on policy capacity
and how it evolves.
Further, while East Asian developmental states relied on what can be called
bilateral embeddedness with industry leaders then, today we arguably need
something that can be termed as multilateral embeddedness with various
knowledge poles and actors (see also Evans, 2009, and Jayasuriya, 2005
from a public-policy perspective). For instance, the capacity and institu-
tional learning required for negotiating with international financial institu-
tions and local R&D labs tends to be increasingly different and separated
from each other as well. As Evans argues,
17In  the  20
th century  developmental  state,  embeddedness  was
important both as a source of information and because implemen-
tation of shared projects depended on private actors. Insofar as
embeddedness aimed at industrialization the logic of constructing
it  was  comparatively  straightforward.  The  key  information
involved figuring out which industrial projects were feasible and 
what kind of incentives would be required to engage the energy of
the  relevant  firms.  The  ‘culture’  of  leading  firms  had  to  be 
reshaped so that competition was seen more in terms of innova-
tion and risk taking. The primary cast of partners was a small set
of industrial elites with relatively well-defined interests. Building
ties on the basis of personal networks and administrative structure 
was a feasible project. (2009)
In order words, while both PPfI and industrial policy assume strong policy
capacity, WTO regulations compound the capacity-building through short-
ening policy-learning cycles: implementing universal rules is more or less the
full policy cycle. While experimenting with various industrial policy meas-
ures – and often failing – is one of the key elements in East Asia’s success
story (see, e.g., Okimoto, 1989 for a discussion of sectors in which Japan’s
industrial policy failed), government failures are seen today in the WTO
framework  as  the  cardinal  sin  of  development  policy.  Indeed,  the
Washington-Consensus policy framework prevailing in WTO emphasizes,
first, macro-economic competencies (e.g. inflation targeting, fiscal disci-
pline) and, second, the need to transfer policies from the best practice tool-
box of the time. (See further Karo & Kattel, 2010b on Eastern Europe in this
context and Kattel & Primi, 2010 on comparing Latin America and Eastern
Europe) Essentially, developing countries have become policy takers with
the ascendance of WTO and Washington Consensus in the 1990s. As a
result, the respective policies in most developing economies have been con-
verging with the developed countries’ policies (in IPR, innovation, R&D, FDI
and other fields). Yet, this convergence in policy is accompanied by the hol-
lowing or non-emergence of the local capacity to analyze and evaluate
domestic policy issues because of the de-contextualization of policy-making
through the very same convergence. (Karo & Kattel, 2010b) That is, while
developing countries are voluntarily or involuntarily increasingly copying and
transferring policies from developed countries and international organiza-
tions, this usually exasperates their problems as local capacity development
is thwarted as policy experimentation is minimal.
Public procurement for innovation and development paradox
The innovation theory and the history of economic development demon-
strates that public procurement for innovation not only leads to global tech-
nology revolutions, but can be used as a systematic tool for catching-up.
18PPfI is among those economic development measures that the developed
countries have extensively used in order to gain the dominating power in
world markets. Moreover, the recent initiatives in the developed world (e.g.
the EU “lead-market” initiative) as well as the developing world (e.g. China
– OECD, 2008) show that public procurement for innovation has been
rediscovered as an economic development mechanism. Therefore, if devel-
oping countries used public procurement only for increasing cost-effective-
ness through the creation of level playing-field, these countries would vol-
untarily give up on using one of the most powerful demand-side innovation
policy tools to promote innovation, industrial development, competitiveness
and economic growth.
In spite of the fact that the GPA rules are not applied to the majority of the
developing world, these countries are often not well positioned for PPfI.
Without specific capacities it is problematic to implement PPfI and, for
example,  conduct  proper  market  intelligence,  develop  public  technology
platforms, transform societal needs into functional requirements, tackle cor-
ruptive behavior, change risk-aversive culture of public procurers towards
risk-managing and avoid coordination failures. Also, the developing coun-
tries are increasingly becoming part of bilateral trade agreements (BTA),
where in addition to issues such as IPRs, investments etc. the question of
public procurement is often addressed. These agreements, together with
other multilateral and WTO agreements, diminish further the policy space
available for PPfI.
The WTO GPA aims at liberalizing world trade in the public procurement
markets. It is, however, highly questionable whether the developing coun-
tries – after joining the GPA – could avoid short-term or long-term losses in
terms of, e.g., lost jobs. As already stated above, if developing countries’
governments  were  to  join  the  GPA  under  current  circumstances,  they
would put their respective markets under unfair competition due to struc-
tural and also institutional imbalances. 
Although the developing countries are often advised to join the GPA frame-
work, the treaty makes it complicated to use the direct and indirect PPfI prin-
ciples together with other innovation policy tools. The GPA framework is
targeted towards equal treatment, effective competition and technical effi-
ciency, but effective PPfI policy is not so much about securing maximum
competition and level playing field, but about the ability to create positive
spillovers.
16 For the latter to happen, the governments need to engage in
interactive learning and collaboration with market, which contradicts to the
19
16 See Cabral et al. (2006) for further discussion about the relationships between innovation and the
level of competition.GPA principles. This contradiction is evidenced by the problems some of the
European Union member countries face when trying to establish explicit PPfI
policies (see Edquist, 2009; Edquist et al., 2000, but also ECEG, 2005).
At the same time, PPfI assumes a relatively high level of policy and admin-
istrative capacities, which developing countries often lack and which are
hard to gain under the prevailing – decontextualized – WTO policy making
principles. Furthermore, PPfI assumes high level of existing competitiveness
in order for the procurement to become a realistic innovation policy tool
(Lember et al., 2011). This, again, is not often the case with developing
countries. The developed countries have usually more policy capacity and
existing competitiveness on the market to pursue with the large scale PPfI
policies, which makes it more probable for them to succeed under the GPA
framework. But even in the more developed context PPfI is not easily appli-
cable because of the need to comply with international regulations. 
Thus, one can observe that the issue of PPfI and developing countries under
the  WTO  framework  is  full  of  contradictions  and  paradoxes.  It  can  be
claimed that the WTO GPA would pose serious limits to developing coun-
tries if they were to join the treaty: it would make it much more complicat-
ed to implement the PPfI policy in areas critical to national competitiveness
and growth. At the same time, implementing PPfI without proper policy
capacity is likely to produce no or negative results. Figure 1 summarizes this.
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Paradox II: Developing countries
have not joined GPA, and thus
could employ PPfI as a vehicle for
structural changes, but their capa-
bility to do so is limited due to
low policy capacity, BLAs and
WTO agreements
Paradox IV: PP is possible to use
for supporting innovation and
development (thus structural
development) under GPA, but
assumes very high policy capacity
and competitive markets
Paradox III: Developing countries
are advised to join GPA, but this
would cause – due to structural
imbalances – serious loss in short-





Paradox I: To have a policy that
employs public procurement only
to create “level playing field”
would mean not to use one of the
most powerful demand-side inno-
vation and industrial policy tools
the developed countries have
used for centuries
Figure 1: Public procurement for innovation paradoxesIt has been suggested by many authors that one of the possible strategies
to alleviate the GPA shortcomings and motivate the developing countries to
join the GPA is gradual accession (Arrowsmith, 2003; Trionfetti, 2000). At
first glance, this seems to be a viable strategy. It would give the develop-
ing countries the needed time to build up a proper public procurement sys-
tem and allows them to plan for measures that diminish the negative effects
from opening up the government markets. More importantly, while using
the discriminatory procurement practices, the developing countries would
enjoy  immediate  access  to  other  markets  during  the  adaption  period
(Trionfetti, 2000). But the problem is that the gradual adoption of the GPA
agreement alone will not suffice. In spite of the fact that the GPA offers the
developing countries the possibility to negotiate on exceptions (incl. indus-
trial policy related ones), the exceptions need to be specified in advance,
which diminishes the possibilities for policy experimentation and trial-and-
error approach. As stated by Arrowsmith, “the possibility is subject to the
approval of the Committee of Government Procurement, and developing
countries may – rightly – fear that this will not be forthcoming when such
policies affect important interests of the other parties” (2003, p. 447). The
very specific PPfI programs are subject to failures and take time to devel-
op. It is difficult to predict when and how the positive externalities from the
PPfI  policies  will  diffuse  to  the  market.  Also,  large-scale  PPfI  policies
assume that the PPfI principles were adopted across the public sector, but
it  is  highly  problematic  to  create  this  kind  of  policy  and  administrative
capacity within a limited period of time.
As a result, the use of more indirect or so-called soft PPfI measures could
be suggested as an alternative for developing countries. This, in turn, would
mean that developing countries should initially direct their policy-capacity
efforts at building competencies, coordination mechanisms and policy net-
works in order to use the WTO policy space described above. Employing
these  soft  procurement  measures  –  setting  priority  activities/pro-
ducts/technologies with detailed action plans, quality standards etc. – can
be viewed as a step-by-step approach towards building capacity for PPfI.
This should be seen mostly in the context of gradually building policy capac-
ities where we can argue for a continuum to exist from implementing WTO
agreements without any flexibilities and amendments over soft procure-
ment practices deploying classical industrial policy measures still available
under WTO, up to full scale PPfI. While it may seem counterintuitive to
argue that PPfI demands higher levels of policy capacity than industrial pol-
icy measures, as we have argued above, the margin of error in the PPfI
framework tends to be much narrower while industrial policy has always
been  about  trial-and-error  and  policy  experimentation.  (Rodrik,  2007)  In
recent literature, perhaps one of the best examples is the excellent study
by Reichman (2009) on policy flexibilities for developing countries under
TRIPS. One of the main recommendations – along many detailed flexibilities
21– is that interagency coordination of the intellectual-property-rights (IPR)
policy in a country seems to be the most important factor in determining
whether  a  given  country  is  able  to  develop  IPR  policies  under  TRIPS
designed to its needs or not. (See also the study on varying TRIPS imple-
mentations among developing countries by Deere, 2009) As a matter of
fact, countries like Brazil, India and China are increasingly using (or have
been using for a decade) experimentation in industrial policy as a way to
enhance policy capacity under WTO rules and indeed stand up against pres-
sures from the US and the EU. (See Shadlen, 2010 on Brazil’s experiments
in IPR agencies and policies)
Conclusion: towards understanding public procurement in the context
of industrial policy and development
If public procurement for innovation was to be seen as part of developing
countries’ industrial-policy portfolio, the accession to the GPA under current
circumstances would not help. At the same time, because of the public pro-
curement paradox, it is likely that the developing world could benefit from
direct PPfI only to a limited extent. While the gradual accession to GPA
could be seen as a positive step ahead, the developing countries should
review  its  other  opportunities  within  the  WTO  framework  as  well.
Therefore, what is needed is more freedom for maneuver within other WTO
agreements for developing countries as in this way it becomes possible to
use more indirect PPfI, which depends less on administrative and policy
capacity and market competitiveness. Table 2 summarizes the current pol-
icy space for developing countries to use PPfI and industrial policy.
It can be seen from the table that the developing countries have four strate-
gies to choose from when designing and implementing public procurement
policies in the context of economic development and catching-up. The first
option – public procurement as a level playing field – builds on the assump-
tion of comparative advantage. This view, which is widely supported by the
existing GPA literature, underlines the effect of transparent, non-discrimi-
natory and free competition as the only way for promoting innovation and
industrial  development.  The  current  WTO  and  GPA  frameworks  are
designed to support this kind of policy approach. However, based on the
arguments  presented  earlier  in  this  article,  it  can  be  argued  that  this
approach falls short in creating the needed spillover effects for innovation,
technology and development, and may deepen the low equilibrium trap.
The second option – discriminatory public procurement – is based on pro-
tectionism ideas and is often used to make the case for or against industri-
al policies. This is a tool the governments use to exclude competition from
the public procurement market, promote secondary policies or pursue hid-
22den personal or political agendas. For the governments that are members of
WTO but not GPA, the strategy is relatively easy to use if they had the pol-
icy capacity – which developing countries mostly do not have. The idea of
GPA, on the contrary, is to limit this kind of policies. The problem with the
discriminatory approach is that it minimizes the effect of competition and
that it is often used universally, i.e. not in accordance with the actual indus-
trial or innovation policy needs. The third option – PPfI – is about promot-
ing innovation, competitive advantage and diversified economy. It builds on
the evolutionary economics, which underlines the importance of policy-
learning and use of technology. However, here the competition effect is
highly  dependent  on  the  existing  market  competitiveness,  which  is  not
always the case in developing countries. While the general WTO framework
does not directly influence the use of PPfI strategy, the developing coun-
tries would face severe restrictions when employing the tool under the cur-
rent GPA framework. The problem with PPfI is that it may take a long time
before a government is able to develop proper PPfI related policy and admin-
istrative capacities across the public sector. The fourth option – ‘soft’ pub-
lic procurement measures – builds on the same grounds as PPfI, but here
the main obstacles are found in the general WTO principles and agree-
ments. Compared to the PPfI, the policy capacity is the main deficiency the
developing countries may face, but as the approach itself assumes more
robust measures to be centrally applied, the governments can more easily
start the learning-by-doing process that is inevitable for this kind of policy-
making.
In sum, public procurement as part of industrial policy has a lot more to
offer for developing countries than the current discussion demonstrates.
However, in order to employ public procurement for the sake of innovation
and  thus  economic  development,  the  developing  countries  should  not
directly transfer the respective policies from the developed world. Because
of the international institutional settings and the complex nature of PPfI, the
developing  countries  should  first  develop  more  robust  innovation  policy
skills and competences within the current WTO policy space and then grad-
ually move towards specific PPfI policy-making. 




















































































We would like to thank Wolfgang Drecshler, Erkki Karo and two anonymous
reviewers for their comments on an earlier draft. The research for this paper
was partially supported by Estonian Science Foundation (grants no 8418,
7577, 7441).References
Amsden, A. (1989). Asia’s Next Giant: South Korea and Late Industriali-
zation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Amsden,  A.  (2005).  “Promoting  Industry  under  WTO  Law.”  In  K.  P.
Gallagher (Ed.). Putting Development First: The Importance of Policy
Space in the WTO and International Financial Institutions (pp. 216-
232). London and New York: Zed books.
Arrowsmith, S. (2003). Government Procurement in the WTO. The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International.
Arthur, W. B. (1994). Increasing Returns and Path Dependence in the Eco-
nomy. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Backhaus, J. & Wagner, R. E. (2004). “Society, State, and Public Finance:
Setting the Analytical Stage.” In J. Backhaus & R. E. Wagner (Eds.). 
Handbook of Public Finance (pp. 1-18). Boston et al: Kluwer.
Cabral,  L.,  Cozzi,  G.,  Denicoló,  V.,  Spagnolo,  G.  &  Zanza,  M.  (2006). 
“Procuring Innovations.” In N. Dimitri, G. Piga & G. Spagnolo (Eds.). 
Handbook of Procurement (pp. 483-528). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Cave, J. and Frinking, E. (2007). Public Procurement for R&D. University of
Warwick.  [On-line]  Available  at:  http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/
soc/economics/staff/faculty/cave/publications/pp_for_rd.pdf.
[Retrieved March 29, 2010]. 
Chandler, A. D., Jr. (2005) Inventing the Electronic Century: The Epic Story 
of the Consumer Electronics and Computer Industries. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Chang, H.-J. (2002). Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in 
Historical Perspective. London: Anthem.
Chibber, V. (2003). Locked in Place: State Building and Late Industriali-
zation in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Cimoli, M., Dosi, G., Nelson, R. & Stiglitz, J. (2006). “Institutions and 
Policies  Shaping  Industrial  Development:  An  Introductory  Note.”
LEM Working Paper Series, 2/2006. [On-line]. Available at: http:// 
www.lem.sssup.it/WPLem/  files/2006-02.pdf.  [Retrieved  March
29, 2010].
Cimoli, M., Dosi, G. & Stiglitz, J. E. (Eds.). (2009). Industrial Policy and 
Development. The Political Economy of Capabilities Accumulation. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Cimoli, M., Coriat, B. & Primi, A. (2009). “Intellectual Property and Indus-
trial Development: A Critical Assessment.” In M. Cimoli, G. Dosi &
J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.). Industrial Policy and Development. The Political 
Economy  of  Capabilities  Accumulation (pp.  506-538).  Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Cole, C. W. (1964). Colbert and a Century of French Mercantilism. Vols 1-
2. New York: Columbia University Press.
25Correa, C. M. (2000). Intellectual Property Rights, the WTO and Developing
Countrie: The TRIPS Agreement and Policy Options. London and 
New York: Zed books.
Deere, Carolyn (2009). The Implementation Game: The TRIPS Agreement 
and the Global Politics of Intellectual Property Reform in Developing 
Countries. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dosi, G. (1982). “Technological Paradigms and Technological Trajectories: 
A Suggested Interpretation of the Determinants and Directions of
Technical Change”. Research Policy 11 (3): 147-162.
Dosi, G. & Soete, L. (1988) “Technical Change and International Trade.” In
G. Dosi, C. Freeman, R. Nelson & L. Soete (Eds.). Technical Change 
and Economic Theory (pp. 401-431). London: Pinter.
Drechsler, W. (2004) “Natural vs. Social Sciences: On Understanding in
Economics.” In E. S. Reinert (ed.). Globalization, Economic Develop-
ment and Inequality: An Alternative Perspective (pp. 71-87). Chel-
tenham: Elgar.
Drechsler,  W.  (2005).  “The  Rise  and  Demise  of  the  New  Public
Management.” Post-autistic economics review, 33.
Dreyfuss, Rochelle D. (2009). “The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other
Emerging Economies in Establishing Access Norms for Intellectual
Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking.” IILJ Working Paper 
2009/5.
ECEG (European Commission Expert Group). (2005). Public Procurement 
for  Research  and  Innovation:  Developing  Procurement  Practices
Favourable  to  R&D  and  Innovation. Expert  Group  Report  EUR 
21793  EN.  [On-line]  Available  at:  http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-
research/pdf/download_en/  edited_report_18112005_on_public_ 
procurement_for_research_and_innovation.pdf.  [Retrieved  Novem-
ber 12, 2009].
ECWG  (European  Commission  Working  Group).  (2006).  Pre-Commercial 
Procurement of Innovation: A Missing Link in the European Innova-
tion Cycle. Working Group Report. [On-line] Available at: http://ec.
europa.eu/information_society/research/key_docs/documents/
procurement.pdf. [Retrieved December 16, 2007].
Edler, J. (2006). Demand Oriented Innovation Policy. Paper presented at the 
ProACT Conference, Tampere, Finland, 15–17 March 2006.
Edler,  J.  &  Georghiou,  L.  (2007).  “Public  Procurement  and  Innovation:
Resurrecting the Demand Side.” Research Policy, 36: 949-963.
Edquist, C. & Hommen, L. (2000). “Public Technology Procurement and 
Innovation Theory.” In C. Edquist, L. Hommen & L. Tsipouri (Eds.).
Public Technology Procurement and Innovation (pp. 5-70). Norwell: 
Kluwer Academic.
Edquist, C., Hommen, L. & Tsipouri, L. (2000). Public Technology Procure-
ment and Innovation. Norwell: Kluwer Academic.
Edquist, C. (2009). Public Procurement for Innovation (PPI) – a Pilot Study.
26CIRCLE Working Paper no. 2009/13. Lund: Lund University.
European  Commission.  (2010).  Europe  2020.  A  European  strategy  for 
smart,  sustainable  and  inclusive  growth. [On-line]  Available  at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20  EN%20BARRO
SO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202  020%20-%20EN%
20version.pdf [Retrieved May 28, 2010].
Evans, P. (1995). Embedded Autonomy: States and Industrial Transfor-
mation. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Evans,  P.  (2009).  “Constructing  the  21
st Century  Developmental  State:
Potentialities and Pitfalls.” [On-line]. Available at http://www.ideiad. 
com.br/seminariointernacional/. [Retrieved March 29, 2010].
Evans,  P.  B.  &  Rauch,  J.  (1999).  “Bureaucracy  and  Growth:  A  Cross-
National Analysis of the Effects of Weberian State Structures on
Economic Growth.” American Sociological Review, 64 (5): 748-
765.
Evenett, S. J. (2002). “Multilateral Disciplines and Government Procure-
ment” In B. M. Hoekman, A. Mattoo & P. English (Eds.). Develop-
ment, Trade and the WTO: A Handbook (pp. 417-427). Washington 
DC: The World Bank. 
Evenett,  S.  J.  &  Hoekman,  B.  M.  (2005).  “Government  Procurement: 
Market Access, Transparency, and Multilateral Trade Rules.” Euro-
pean Journal of Political Economy, 21 (1): 163-183. 
Freeman,  C.  (1974).  The  Economics  of  Industrial  Innovation. London:
Routledge.
Freeman,  C.  (1987).  Technology  Policy  and  Economic  Performance: 
Lessons from Japan. London: Pinter.
Freeman, C., Clark, J. & Soete, L. (1982). Unemployment and Technical 
Innovation: A Study of Long Waves and Economic Development.
London: Greenwood.
Freeman, C. & Louçã, F. (2001). As Time Goes by: From the Industrial 
Revolutions to the Information Revolution. Oxford: OUP.
Gallagher, K. P. (Ed.). (2005). Putting Development First: The Importance
of Policy Space in the WTO and International Financial Institutions.
London and New York: Zed books.
Geroski, P. A. (1990). “Procurement Policy as a Tool of Industrial Policy.” 
International Review of Applied Economics, 4 (2): 182-198.
Gomory, R. E. & Baumol, W. J. (2004). “Globalization: Prospects, Promise 
and Problems.” Journal of Policy Modeling, 26 (4): 425-438.
Jayasuriya, K. (2005). “Capacity Beyond the Boundary: New Regulatory 
State, Fragmentation, and Relational Capacity.” In M. Pinter & J. 
Pierre (Eds.). Challenges to State Policy Capacity: Global Trends and
Comparative  Perspectives (pp.  19-37).  Basingstoke:  Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Karo, E. & Kattel, R. (2010a). “Is ‘Open Innovation’ Re-Inventing Innovation 
Policy for Catching-up Economies?” The Other Canon Foundation 
27and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in Technology 
Governance and Economic Dynamics, No. 30. [On-line]. Available at 
www.technologygovernance.eu. [Retrieved March 29, 2010].
Karo, E. & Kattel, R. (2010b). “The Copying Paradox: Why Converging 
Policies but Diverging Capacities for Development in Eastern Euro-
pean Innovation Systems?” The International Journal of Institutions
and Economies, 2 (2): forthcoming.
Kattel, R., Kregel, J. A. & Reinert, E. S. (2009). “The Relevance of Ragnar
Nurkse and Classical Development Economics.” In R. Kattel, J. A.
Kregel & E. S. Reinert (Eds.). Ragnar Nurkse (1907-2007): Classical 
Development Economics and its Relevance for Today (pp. 1-28).
London: Anthem.
Kattel, R. & Primi, A. (2010). “The Periphery Paradox in Innovation Policy: 
Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared.” The Other Canon 
Foundation and Tallinn University of Technology Working Papers in
Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics, No. 29. [On-line]. 
Available at www.technologygovernance.eu. [Retrieved March 29,
2010].
King,  C.  (1721).  The  British  Merchant  or  Commerce  Preserv’d. 3  vols.
London: John Darby.
Kregel,  J.  A.  (2008a).  “Changes  in  the  U.S.  Financial  System  and  the 
Subprime  Crisis.”  The  Levy  Economics  Institute  of  Bard  College 
Working Paper No 530. [On-line]. Available at http://www.levy.org/ 
pubs/wp_530.pdf. [Retrieved March 29, 2010].
Kregel, J. A. (2008b). “The Discrete Charm of the Washington Consensus.”
The Levy Economics Institute of Bard College Working Paper No 
533. [On-line]. Available at http://www.levy.org/pubs/wp_533.pdf. 
[Retrieved March 29, 2010].
Krugman, P. & Obstfeld, M. (2000). International Economics: Theory and 
Policy. (5
th ed.). Reading: Addison-Wesley. 
Lember, V., Kalvet, T. & Kattel, R. (2011). “Urban competitiveness and
public procurement for innovation.” Urban Studies, in press.
Li, Xuan & Correa, C. M. (Eds.). (2009). Intellectual Property Enforcement: 
International Perspectives. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Lin, J. Y. (2009). “New Structural Economics. A Framework for Rethinking 
Development.”  [On-line].  Available  at  http://siteresources.
worldbank.org/INTMACRO/Resources/NewStructuralEconomics_ 
JLin.pdf. [Retrieved March 29, 2010].
List, F. (1827 [1996]). Outlines of American Political Economy: Grundriss 
der amerikanischen politischen Ökonomie. Wiesbaden: Böttinger.
Murmann,  J.  P.  &  Landau,  R.  (1998)  “On  the  Making  of  Competitive 
Advantage: The Development of the Chemical Industries in Britain
and Germany since 1850.” In A. Arora, R. Landau and N. Rosen-
berg (Eds.). Chemicals and Long-Term Economic Growth. Insights 
from the Chemical Century. New York: Wiley.
28Nelson,  R.  &  Winter,  S.  (1982).  An  Evolutionary  Theory  of  Economic
Change. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
New  Zealand  Ministry  of  Economic  Development.  2005.  New  Zealand 
Government Procurement Policy Review Part Two: Realising the
Potential for Innovation.
Nyiri, L., Osimo, D., Özcivelek, R., Centeno, C. & Cabrera, M. (2007). 
Public Procurement for the Promotion of R&D and Innovation in ICT.
Institute for Prospective Technological Studies. Luxembourg: Office
for Official Publications of the European Communities.
OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development). (2008).
OECD reviews of innovation policy: China. OECD Publishing. 
OECD  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development). 
(2009a). OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Korea. Paris: OECD
Publishing.
OECD  (Organisation  for  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development). 
(2009b). OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: Mexico. Paris: OECD 
Publishing.
Okimoto, D. I. (1989). Between MITI and the Market: Japanese Industrial 
Policy for High Technology. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Palley, T. (2006) “Rethinking Trade and Trade Policy: Gomory, Baumol, and
Samuelson on Comparative Advantage.” The Levy Economics Insti-
tute of Bard College, 86.
Perez, C. (1983) “Structural Change and Assimilation of New Technologies
in the Economic and Social Systems”. Futures 15 (4): 357-375.
Perez,  C.  (2002).  Technological  Revolutions  and  Financial  Capital:  The
Dynamics of Bubbles and Golden Ages. Cheltenham: Elgar.
Raghavan, C. (2009). Financial Services, the WTO and Initiatives for Global 
Financial  Reform. Intergovernmental  Group  of  25.  [On-line]. 
Available at http://www.g24.org/cr0909.pdf. [Retrieved March 29, 
2010].
Reichman, J. H. (2009). “Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century:
Will the Developing Countries Lead or Follow?” [On-line]. Available 
at  http:///www.ideiad.com.br/seminariointernacional.  [Retrieved 
March 29, 2010].
Reinert, E. S. (2007). How Rich Countries Got Rich and Why Poor Countries
Stay Poor. London: Constable & Robinson.
Reinert,  E.  S.  (2009).  “Emulation  versus  Comparative  Advantage: 
Competing and Complementary Principles in the History of Econo-
mic Policy.” In M. Cimoli, G. Dosi & J. E. Stiglitz (Eds.). Industrial
Policy  and  Development.  The  Political  Economy  of  Capabilities
Accumulation (pp. 79-106). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rodrik, D. (2007). One Economics, Many Recipes. Globalization, Institu-
tions,  and  Economic  Growth. Princeton  and  Oxford:  Princeton
University Press.
Rolfstam, M. (2009). “Public Procurement as an Innovation Policy Tool: the 
29Role of Institutions.” Science and Public Policy, 36 (5): 349-360.
Rothwell, R. (1984). “Creating a Regional Innovation-Oriented Infrastruc-
ture: The Role of Public Procurement.” Annals of Public & Coope-
rative Economics, 55 (2): 159-172.
Ruttan, V. W. (2006). Is War Necessary for Economic Growth? Military 
Procurement and Technology Development. New York: Oxford Uni-
versity Press.
Sachs, J. (2008). Common Wealth: Economics for a Crowded Planet. New 
York: Penguin Press.
Serra, A. (1613). Breve trattato delle cause che possono far abbondare l’oro
e l’argento dove non sono miniere [Short Treatise on the Causes 
that Make Kingdoms Abound in Gold and Silver even in the Absence
of Mines]. Naples: Lazzaro Scorriggio.
Shadlen, K. (2003). “Patents and Pills, Power and Procedure: The North-
South Politics of Public Health in the WTO.” Development Studies 
Institute, Working Papers, No 03-42.
Shadlen,  K.  (2005).  “Policy  Space  for  Development  in  the  WTO  and
Beyond: The Case of Intellectual Property Rights.” Global Develop-
ment and Environment Institute Working Papers, No 05-06.
Shadlen, K. (2010). “The Politics of Pharmaceutical Patent Examination: 
Lessons from Brazil.” Paper at MIND conference in Rio de Janeiro, 
November, 2009.
Singh,  A.  (2002).  “Competition  and  Competition  Policy  in  Emerging
Markets:  International  and  Developmental  Dimensions.”  G-24
Discussion Paper Series, No 18.
Soll,  J.  (2009).  The  Information  Master:  Jean-Baptiste  Colbert’s  Secret
State Intelligence System. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
Ssennoga, F. (2006). “Examining Discriminatory Procurement Practices in
Developing Countries.” Journal of Public Procurement 6 (3): 218-
249.
Thrasher, R. D. & Gallagher, K. P. (2008). “21
st Century Trade Agreements: 
Implications for Long-Run Development Policy.” The Pardee Papers, 
No. 2.
Trionfetti, F. (2000). “Discriminatory Public Procurement and International 
Trade.” The World Economy 23 (1): 57-76. 
Uyarra, E. and Flanagan, K. (2009). “Understanding the innovation impacts 
of public procurement.” European Planning Studies 18 (1): 123-
143.
Wade, R. (2003). “What Strategies Are Viable for Developing Countries 
today? The World Trade Organization and the Shrinking of ‘Develop-
ment Space’.” Review of International Political Economy, 10 (4):
621-644.
Wade, R. (2004). Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of 
Government  in  East  Asian  Industrialisation.  (2
nd ed.).  Princeton: 
Princeton University Press.
30Weiss, L. & Thurbon, E. (2006). “The Business of Buying American: Public 
Procurement as Trade Strategy in the USA.” Review of International
Political Economy 13 (5): 701–724.
Williamson, John (2002). “What Washington Means by Policy Reform.” 
(Updated version of his 1990 article). [On-line]. Available at http:// 
www.iie.com/publications/papers/paper.  cfm?ResearchID  =486.
[Retrieved March 29, 2010].
World Bank (2008a). The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained Growth
and  Inclusive  Development. [On-line].  Available  at  http://www. 
growthcommission.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=
view&id=96&Itemid=169. [Retrieved March 29, 2010].
World Bank (2008b). Science, Technology, and Innovation: Capacity Buil-
ding  for  Sustainable  Growth  and  Poverty  Reduction. [On-line]. 
Available  at  http://go.worldbank.org/GEYA2  NRGW0.  [Retrieved
March 29, 2010].
3132 32
Working Papers in Technology Governance and Economic Dynamics 
The Other Canon Foundation, Norway, and the Technology Governance
program at Tallinn University of Technology (TUT), Estonia, have launched
a  new  working  papers  series,  entitled  “Working  Papers  in  Technology
Governance and Economic Dynamics”. In the context denoted by the title
series, it will publish original research papers, both practical and theoretical,
both narrative and analytical, in the area denoted by such concepts as
uneven economic growth, techno-economic paradigms, the history and the-
ory of economic policy, innovation strategies, and the public management
of innovation, but also generally in the wider fields of industrial policy,
development, technology, institutions, finance, public policy, and econom-
ic and financial history and theory.
The idea is to offer a venue for quickly presenting interesting papers –
scholarly articles, especially as preprints, lectures, essays in a form that
may be developed further later on – in a high-quality, nicely formatted ver-
sion, free of charge: all working papers are downloadable for free from
http://hum.ttu.ee/tg as soon as they appear, and you may also order a free
subscription by e-mail attachment directly from the same website.










Erik S. Reinert, Evolutionary Economics, Classical Development
Economics,  and  the  History  of  Economic  Policy:  A  Plea  for
Theorizing by Inclusion.
Richard R. Nelson, Economic Development from the Perspective
of Evolutionary Economic Theory.
Erik S. Reinert, Development and Social Goals: Balancing Aid and
Development to Prevent ‘Welfare Colonialism’.
Jan  Kregel  and  Leonardo  Burlamaqui,  Finance,  Competition,
Instability,  and  Development  Microfoundations  and  Financial
Scaffolding of the Economy.
Erik S. Reinert, European Integration, Innovations and Uneven
Economic Growth: Challenges and Problems of EU 2005.
Leonardo  Burlamaqui,  How  Should  Competition  Policies  and
Intellectual Property Issues Interact in a Globalised World?
A Schumpeterian Perspective
Paolo  Crestanello  and  Giuseppe  Tattara,  Connections  and
Competences  in  the  Governance  of  the  Value  Chain.  How
Industrial Countries Keep their Competitive Power
Sophus A. Reinert, Darwin and the Body Politic: Schäffle, Veblen,
and the Shift of Biological Metaphor in Economics33 33
Antonio Serra, Breve Trattato / A Short Treatise (1613) (available
only in hardcopy and by request).
Joseph  L.  Love,  The  Latin  American  Contribution  to  Center-
Periphery Perspectives: History and Prospect
Ronald Dore, Shareholder capitalism comes to Japan
Per  Högselius,  Learning  to  Destroy.  Case  studies  of  creative
destruction management in the new Europe
Gabriel Yoguel, Analía Erbes, Verónica Robert, and José Borello,
Diffusion and appropriation of knowledge in different organiza-
tional structures
Erik S. Reinert and Rainer Kattel, European Eastern Enlargement
as Europe’s Attempted Economic Suicide?
Carlota Perez, Great Surges of development and alternative forms
of globalization
Erik  S.  Reinert,  Iulie  Aslaksen,  Inger  Marie  G.  Eira,  Svein
Mathiesen, Hugo Reinert &  Ellen Inga Turi, Adapting to Climate
Change in Reindeer Herding: The Nation-State as Problem and
Solution
Lawrence King, Patrick Hamm, The Governance Grenade: Mass
Privatization,  State  Capacity  and  Economic  Development  in
Postcommunist and Reforming Communist Societies
Reinert, Erik S., Yves Ekoué Amaïzo and Rainer Kattel. The
Economics  of  Failed,  Failing  and  Fragile  States:  Productive
Structure as the Missing Link
Carlota Perez, The New Technologies: An Integrated View
Carlota  Perez,  Technological  revolutions  and  techno-economic
paradigms
Rainer Kattel, Jan A. Kregel, Erik S. Reinert, The Relevance of
Ragnar Nurkse and Classical Development Economics
Erik  S.  Reinert,  Financial  Crises,  Persistent  Poverty,  and  the
Terrible Simplifiers in Economics: A Turning Point Towards a New
“1848 Moment”
Rainer  Kattel,  Erik  S.  Reinert  and  Margit  Suurna, Industrial
Restructuring and Innovation Policy in Central and Eastern Europe
since 1990
Erkki  Karo  and  Rainer  Kattel,  The  Copying  Paradox:  Why
Converging Policies but Diverging Capacities for Development in
Eastern European Innovation Systems?
Erik  S.  Reinert,  Emulation  versus  Comparative  Advantage:
Competing  and  Complementary  Principles  in  the  History  of
Economic Policy
Erik S. Reinert, Capitalist Dynamics: A Technical Note
Martin Doornbos, Failing States or Failing Models?: Accounting



















27.Carlota Perez, The financial crisis and the future of innovation: A
view of technical change with the aid of history
Rainer Kattel and Annalisa Primi, The periphery paradox in inno-
vation policy: Latin America and Eastern Europe Compared
Erkki Karo and Rainer Kattel, Is ‘Open Innovation’ Re-Inventing
Innovation Policy for Catching-up Economies?
Rainer Kattel and Veiko Lember, Public procurement as an indus-





The working paper series is edited by Rainer Kattel (kattel@staff.ttu.ee), 
Wolfgang Drechsler (drechsler@staff.ttu.ee), and Erik S. Reinert (reinert@staff.ttu.ee),
who all of them will be happy to receive submissions, suggestions or referrals.
34